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The neural antecedents to voluntary action:
Response to commentaries
Parashkev Nachev1 and Peter Hacker2
1Institute of Neurology, UCL, London, UK
2Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, Kent, UK
Cognitive neuroscience must attend to the conceptual coherence of its hypotheses as well as to their empirical
support. Examining the most inﬂuential studies of the neural antecedents to voluntary action, our Discussion
Paper sought to identify the real-world consequences of neglecting the former in what we argued has been too
narrow a pursuit of the latter. Though conceptual in form, our analysis is sharply empirical in its conclusions,
revealing what have long been thought to be momentous experimental observations—such as the readiness
potential—as the outcome of previously unidentiﬁed confounds that rob them of signiﬁcance. Conversely, we
suggested that experimental studies of two-way control, amongst other deﬁning features of the voluntary, have
been given less emphasis than the subject demands. Here, we ramify our analysis down the paths identiﬁed by
others in the commentaries we received.
Keywords: Voluntary action; Conceptual analysis; Readiness potential; Neurology of law.
The neural basis of voluntary action is arguably as
cardinal a problem in behavioral neuroscience as any.
It certainly cannot be said to be a peripheral, niche
interest, nor one lacking in intelligent attention over at
least a century of intense study. If neuroscience is a
mature discipline, then the study of voluntary action
ought to be mature too, comfortably settled in its
fundamental conceptual framework, clear in the
deﬁnition and stratiﬁcation of its constituent
problems. Whatever the merits and demerits of our
treatment of just one aspect—the neural antecedents
to action—that it should elicit commentaries so diverse
in their range and point is surely evidence of a far
greater need of conceptual evaluation than the surface
historical record suggests. For if the many terabytes of
experimental data gathered in the ﬁeld are balanced on
so small an agreed common conceptual ground, the
structure cannot remain upright for very long. It is easy
to forget that the empirical rests on the conceptual, and
so cannot grow without it.
That need, it must be admitted, is not easy to satisfy,
for the form of analysis it requires is hard to practice
and even harder to teach. This is not so much because
it is intellectually taxing as because it is not merely a
matter of mechanically applying any speciﬁable set of
general principles. The best one can do is to illustrate
the approach, in concrete examples, as we do below in
loosely structured responses to the diversity of
commentaries we received.
THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE
EMPIRICAL
Ramey and Chrysikou are correct that the conceptual
and the empirical are distinct (Ramey & Chrysikou,
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2014). A conceptual error cannot be corrected by
empirical effort, and vice versa. But the two are not
ships that pass in the night, neither bound for the
destination of the other. Each plays its part in the
joint enterprise of revealing the true nature of
human beings, and both need to be right if the
enterprise is to succeed. Moreover, while it is true
that senseless ideas are often more pernicious than
falsehoods, neither is benign. Obtaining experimental
data—at least in behavioral neuroscience—is not like
quarrying marble, of value regardless of the
architecture the material is used to build, because
one may always reuse it in another design. Here the
data are derived from speciﬁc, often highly contrived,
behavioral paradigms that make the general
applicability conditional on the validity of the
underlying hypothesis. Where the hypothesis is
invalid, and the data have a trivial explanation such
as temporal affordance in the case of the
Bereitschaftpotential, the empirical effort cannot be
of much use to anyone.
Inconsequential data, furthermore, make it harder
to resist the temptation to allow the horizon of
empirical possibilities—inevitably constrained by the
technology at our disposal—to limit the space of
conceptual possibilities. It is true that there is little
point in talking about hypotheses for which there is
no empirical test to hand. But equally there are no
grounds for expecting the correct hypothesis to be
easily testable. In science, the question of whether
or not the data ﬁt a hypothesis matters only when
the space of possible hypotheses is reasonably
deﬁned. If the facts admit thousands of other
hypotheses one has not even considered, the only
“empirical support” they can provide is to the
experimenter’s vanity. It is like being pleased with
one’s horse coming ﬁrst in a race in which the rest of
the ﬁeld has not even entered. Where the subject of
study is as complex as the brain, adequate hypothesis
comparison is obviously very hard to achieve. But
then one’s claims to knowledge should be
appropriately tempered: We should admit that there
are things we cannot know, at least not with the
technology at our disposal. If this is obscurantism, it
is virtuous obscurantism.
Now it may well be, as Ramey and Chrysikou
suggest, that new empirical methodologies such as
multivariate fMRI will change this state of affairs.
High-dimensional multivariate approaches can
certainly demonstrate how misguided attempts to
short-circuit the complexity of the brain can lead to
errors, and how such errors may remain undetected
for decades (Mah, Husain, Rees, & Nachev, 2014).
But we do not need to wait for advances in
experimental methodology to get our conceptions
right: All it needs is careful thought about the
constituent concepts, and none of us has any excuse
to forego it.
Allowing oneself to be swayed by the empirical
exposes one to another danger: The misapplication to
the biological, by mistaken analogy, of concepts
properly only applicable to the methodological. The
key example here is the concept of noise. The
measurement of any quantity in the real world is
inevitably limited by inaccuracies in the measuring
tool, whatever that might be. One can never hold it
against an experimental result that it is not perfectly
accurate, for the opposite would be perfectly
implausible. Where a set of observations differs
from a hypothesized theoretical relation it may still
be reasonable to believe that the relation holds. But
this is true only if the residual, unexplained variance
in the observations is not open to a better
explanation. In statistical terms this is conceived in
terms of lack of structure in the residual error, though,
of course, that a structure is not evident at a given
resolution of parameterization does not mean that a
richer approach could not identify one. But in the
domain of voluntary action there is nearly always a
better explanation: The subject’s avowal or report of
what he did or meant to do. The avowal or report of
what the subject did or meant to do is a logical
criterion for the voluntariness and intentionality of
his deed. It is, to be sure, defeasible, but if
undefeated, it provides logically good evidence for
the character of the deed. We have shown that
neurophysiological predictions from Libet-style
experiments not only do not have sufﬁcient
speciﬁcity for the chosen action but also do not
make a comparison with the subject’s ability to
predict at the relevant time his own intentional
actions, assuming unjustiﬁably, that his prediction is
then no better than a guess. The identiﬁcation of
probabilistic biases Sumner discusses at length
therefore has no implications for the locus of
control, as he says, for the marginal uncertainty is
not noise superimposed on a deterministic relation
thereby revealed, but the natural variability of mere
neural correlates that need have no mechanistic—
let alone deterministic—signiﬁcance (Sumner, 2014).
To say this is not to say that a set of physiological
parameters could not be shown to predict an action, or
that a perfectly causal account of a set of voluntary
movements is conceptually impossible: We do not
have to go that far because the data fall so short.
Human beings are biological creatures: Their
thought and behavior are dependent on physical and
chemical processes. That the causal explanations of
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voluntary movements that we have been criticizing
are incoherent does not imply that others must be too.
All we are insisting on here is the need for conceptual
ﬁdelity in stating hypotheses, just as good scientists
naturally insist on empirical ﬁdelity in testing
hypotheses, and the hypotheses offered here have
been found wanting.
That process, which might be called hypothesis
clariﬁcation, implies a careful evaluation of the
constituent concepts of a hypothesis. Just as the
well-formedness of a mathematical formula needs to
be established by examining the relations of its
constituent terms in algebra, so the intelligibility of
a scientiﬁc hypothesis needs to be established by
examining the relations of its constituent terms in
logical grammar. That logical grammar is vastly
more complex than algebra does not mean one can
ignore its rules, for it is they that determine what does
and what does not make sense. A condition for a
hypothesis to be either true or false is that it makes
sense. Moreover, the rules cannot arbitrarily be
changed without exploring the ramifying
consequences, just as the substitution of imaginary
for real numbers cannot be done without altering
their algebraic relations.
Schurger’s skepticism about such conceptual
analysis as a distinct mode of thought is
understandable: After all, the approach is hard to
specify in terms of explicit rules, technicalities,
helpful generalizations: The natural intellectual
equipment of academia (Schurger, 2014). Indeed, it
is precisely these characteristics of the academic that
often land one in deep water, in need of the rope only
conceptual analysis can throw. For, as we have
argued, the principal difﬁculties arise not because
the solutions are hard but because the problems are
opaque and further compounded by the usual
intellectual apparatus brought to bear on them. For
every biological fact that is illuminated by a novel
analogy, an extension to the use of an established
concept, or some other conceptual innovation, a
dozen are thrown into greater darkness. The only
way to proceed is step-by-step, testing the ground
along the way, trusting least the paths all others
have followed.
Be that as it may, that conceptual analysis is
desperately needed seems to us compellingly
illustrated by the case of the Bereitschaftspotential.
Considered one of the seminal ﬁndings in
neurophysiology for over half a century, referred to
in more than 6000 scientiﬁc books and articles, the
physiological foundation of the Libet paradigm—the
most inﬂuential behavioral paradigm in the study of
voluntary action—it is now shown to be merely a
temporal variant of the well-known phenomenon of
affordance. That inference does not proceed from any
new experimental effort—though it may be reﬂected
in it, as it is in Schurger’s own insightful recent work
(Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012)—but purely from a
careful examination of the constituent concepts. The
vast majority of neuroscientists have no difﬁculty in
identifying task affordance as a confound, for the
individuation of actions in terms of their mechanics
and objects is perfectly natural and familiar. The
failure to identify temporal affordance here comes
from the failure to apprehend the individuation of
actions in terms of their timing (von Wright, 1963).
Once that is recognized it is easy to see that the
absence of temporal affordance would be
profoundly surprising, for it would imply that the
brain must respond to temporal possibilities
differently from any other feature of an action,
which is obviously unwarranted, and would go
against one of the few empirical certainties about
the brain: That it is anticipatory in its activity. That
we happen to treat the temporal individuation of
actions differently in language is no grounds for
assuming the underlying neural activity must follow
suit. It is something to be shown experimentally, a
prerequisite for the use of the Bereitschaftspotential
as the foundation of ediﬁces that are otherwise ﬁt only
for demolition practice.
BEYOND THE ANTECEDENTS
A comprehensive conceptual investigation into
voluntary action would be a book, not a paper. In
conﬁning ourselves to the antecedents here we do not
wish to imply contemporaneous or subsequent neural
aspects are immaterial. On the contrary, we wish to
dissolve what we argue is mostly incoherent
speculation about the antecedents precisely so as to
shift attention to the later aspects Schall and Garr
discuss (Schall & Garr, 2014). That this is necessary
is easily seen from the disproportionate space
discussion of the antecedents takes up in the
literature: The most cited papers are either Libet’s or
employ some variant of his ﬂawed behavioral
paradigm.
Since one usually acts so as to affect a desired
change in the environment, voluntary actions that
are also intentional have a goal, unless they are
done intentionally out of mere inclination (without
any further purpose). They may, or may not, achieve
their goal. Such actions, moreover, are learned, which
necessarily implies adaptation driven by the mismatch
between desired and achieved outcome, optimized
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over time. No comprehensive account of voluntary
and intentional action could therefore omit the
consequences of acting: This is conceptually given.
The reﬂection of teleological aspects in the neural
substrate, however, is not easily investigated
empirically. Within a simple conative behavior such
as seeking the satisfaction of thirst, causally relating
the goal to the behavior may be relatively
straightforward. One might identify a simple
biological parameter, say serum osmolarity, that is
intelligibly conceived as the cause of a subsequent
act of drinking. But it is hard to see how the goal of
avoiding rush-hour congestion by taking the 4.15
train to Cambridge rather than the 5.15 can be built
into a causal account of the action of changing one’s
itinerary. We have developed the manifold forms of
explanation of action, including making sense of the
teleological in terms of reasons, driven by a need for
understanding that simple causal accounts cannot
meet (see Hacker, 2007, p. 219). But that practice
has emerged for—and therefore need only satisfy—
the purpose of making our actions intelligible to each
other. It is, however, unsuited to the purpose of
explaining the neural underpinnings of voluntary
action or any other human power, for that is far
from the driving force of its development. If we are
to make sense of the teleological in neural terms,
reasons must be part of the explanandum, not of the
explanation. It is far from clear what that might imply,
since reasons for acting are not causes but warrants or
purported warrants.
The notion of goals naturally presupposes a way of
selecting one goal over another. This “executive”
aspect, rightly emphasized by Schall and Garr (2014),
is constitutive of two-way control, and therefore a
feature of all intentional actions, not only complex
ones, indeed, of all that can bear the name of action,
as opposed to mere bodily movement. When a subject
in a psychophysical experiment is engaged in
something simple, say horizontal saccades in
response to arrow cues at ﬁxation, “executive
control” is not suspended, for he may at any time do
something else of arbitrary complexity. The
compartmentalization of the notion of the executive,
so widespread in the literature (e.g., Norman &
Shallice, 1986), as something that comes into play
only occurrently, is faithless to the fundamental
nature of voluntary action. It is also incoherent, for it
implies a mechanism for invoking the executive, a
“super-executive,” that is vulnerable to the same
problem, thereby setting up an inﬁnite regress. The
inﬂuential notion of a conﬂict detector (Botvinick,
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) does not help
here, for the degree of compatibility or similarity
between two movements is orthogonal to the relative
desirability of the goals they are intended to secure. No
simple index could plausibly determine what is at stake
at any point on the horizon of action; the powers this
requires are too numerous and complex to be assigned
to any isolated region of the brain, let alone a process.
The impulse to do this needs to be recognized as the
crypto-Cartesianism it can only be (see Hacker &
Bennett, 2003 for a comprehensive survey, and
Nachev, 2011 for discussion in relation to the notion
of executive control).
THE CONTINGENT AUTOMATON
Ben-Yami argues that we overestimate the
vulnerability of voluntary action to neural redeﬁnition
(Ben-Yami, 2014). One naturally distinguishes the
voluntary from the involuntary without inspecting the
agent’s brain. The distinction relies on cognitive and
behavioral criteria: All that examination of the
neurophysiology can do is to clarify their reﬂection in
the neural substrate, not to redeﬁne them. Indeed, the
attribution of any neurophysiological feature
presupposes a prior behavioral categorization, for that
is what individuates it in the ﬁrst place. A
neurophysiological feature common to both kinds of
action would be properly interpreted as non-speciﬁc,
not as grounds for reclassifying the actions it
accompanies. Without a fully deterministic account of
the brain, the behavior is always the dog, the
neurophysiology always the tail.
But although the general criteria are clear, their
application to any speciﬁc instance of behavior need
not be. Distinguishing between voluntary and
involuntary movements in pathological conditions
can be very difﬁcult. Patients with complex partial
seizures, for example, may exhibit movements that
appear sufﬁciently voluntary to confuse even
experienced neurologists. The drug-seeking behavior
of an addict may look voluntary—inevitably
construed on the model of normal conative
behaviors where no compulsion is ever truly
irresistible—but it is perfectly possible to conceive
of a drug that reinforces its taking absolutely,
turning the victim into a drug-seeking automaton.
Neurophysiology cannot change the criteria of
voluntary action, but it may help us apply them
correctly where the surface picture is unclear or
misleading.
Two aspects of the distinction between the
voluntary and the involuntary interact to cause this
difﬁculty. First, the most important criterion of
voluntariness—two-way control—is essentially
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counterfactual. One-way control is easily established
by asking someone to do something. But to test that
someone is able not to do something inevitably
presupposes a set of conditions under which one
would do it (if it is indeed involuntary), otherwise it
makes little sense to speak of anything being
withheld. To establish the presence of two-way
control one therefore has to replicate the conditions
that prompt the movement, not the movement itself.
Second, both the nature and timing of the conditions
may be opaque enough for it to be far from obvious
what is to be replicated. Where the behavior has an
identiﬁable object, as with conative behaviors, this
may be relatively easy: Handing an alcoholic a glass
of wine, say, and counting the number of occasions he
is able to stop himself from drinking it over some
ﬁxed interval of time. But even then, the critical
conditions need not include the object itself (e.g.,
“needle freak” drug addicts who become collaterally
addicted to the act of injection alone). Furthermore,
the temporal relation between the conditions and the
behavior may be opaque: Not only need they not be
time-locked, the former could be arbitrarily
antecedent to the latter. The sight of a glass of wine
may compel someone irresistibly to drain it only
when he has been exposed to some other sensory
association earlier in the day. Since the critical
conditions need make themselves manifest only in
the observed behavior—what we are using to
identify them in the ﬁrst place—it may be
exceedingly difﬁcult to get them into clear view.
What matters most is not what the agent does but
what he does not do, in circumstances neither the
nature nor the timing of the movement need
illuminate. It is therefore perfectly possible for
someone to lack two-way control over an action
without anyone noticing: Including the agent
himself. Such covert automaticity cannot be
common, for we generally change our actions—both
spontaneously and in response to changes in the
environment—too ﬂexibly for it to be anything but
an exception, yet it may well occur.
Where a hidden set of critical conditions is
invariantly associated with an action, then,
identifying a predictive neurophysiological
antecedent may help us establish the presence of
covert automaticity. The facility of this depends on
the locus of the conditions. Where they are external to
the agent, beyond the horizon of his control,
automaticity is easy to establish for we can show
that we can control him simply by recreating the
conditions. By contrast, where they are conﬁned to
the body of the agent, we can only predict what he
will do (assuming that we have no control over his
body), and even then predict only as early as the
antecedent appears, which as we have seen is
usually measured only in milliseconds. Prediction
alone does not imply automaticity, it merely opens a
temporal interval (between the antecedent and the
action) during which one can test for the absence of
two-way control. But since the characteristic
ﬂexibility of voluntary action typically operates at
time scales much longer than milliseconds, the
timing of observed predictive antecedents leaves no
room. In such circumstances the question of covert
automaticity is therefore constitutively
indeterminable: We plainly cannot test two-way
control if we cannot dissociate an action from the
conditions under which it is supposed to be withheld.
To make so much of the exceptional (and the
pathological) may be thought unhelpfully to shift the
focus away from the general nature of voluntary
action, which is the primary concern. But what a
synoptic survey of the conceptual landscape here
lacks is precisely the hidden, dark ravines between
the bright peaks in clear view. It is there that one is
prone to lose one’s footing, and is most in need of a
sharp conceptual icepick to stay on the track.
Moreover, pathology surrounds (and eventually
engulfs) all of us, blending with normality at
multiple points in the domain of action of
considerable social signiﬁcance.
In illustration, imagine the hypothetical case of a
“contingent automaton”: A man addicted to a harmful
drug to the extent of being completely unable to resist
taking it under some speciﬁc set of environmental
conditions. Where these conditions obtain, he will
always take the drug—involuntarily—where they do
not, he may or may not take it—voluntarily. In
ignorance of the identity of the critical conditions
his drug-seeking behavior is most naturally
described as the outcome of an imperfect two-way
power: Always being able to choose to take the drug,
but only sometimes succeeding in resisting it. So
perceived, the case mirrors conventional conative
behavior where the agent may be said occasionally
to have yielded to a temptation, and is correctly
condemned—morally—for failing to resist it because
he could have done otherwise. But the rules of normal
conative behavior do not apply where the set of
critical conditions is met. Then the behavior is
involuntary, and is no more deserving of opprobrium
than a knee-jerk or anything else comparably
automatic.
Now the critical conditions may be far from
obvious, as we have said, and their apparent absence
is no grounds for dismissing the possibility. Just as an
action is voluntary if the behavioral criteria of
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voluntariness are satisﬁed, so it is not voluntary if
they are not, no matter how complex or elaborate its
behavioral and cognitive features. Equally, our
contingent automaton may tell us that he could have
done otherwise, that he will resist next time, that this
was an exceptional case, and so on, but his avowal,
though criterial (logically good evidence) for his
intentional action, can be defeated by what he
actually does. If we are able to identify a set of
critical conditions that make the action automatic—
with or without the help of a neurophysiological
marker—then the normal conative game is no longer
in play, whatever the agent might say. Of course, this
is only a hypothetical case that may or may not ever
obtain in reality. Our task is to mark the limits of
conceptual possibility, not to make any claims about
the fundamental nature of addiction, which is an
empirical matter to be determined by clinical study.
MORALITY AND THE LAW
The domain of action is partly coincident with the
domains of morality and law. A change in our
conception of the fundamental nature of action,
whether through neuroscience or other means, will
naturally ramify into its moral and legal contexts.
This is especially true of a change that affects the
applicability of the notion of responsibility, for on that
rests the key distinction between an agent who may
be condemned or praised for his actions and a patient
whose actions may only evoke sympathy. Where the
distinction is clear—in the obviously insane—the
moral and legal positions are largely settled. The
boundaries, however, are a matter of contention,
over a wide territory.
The difﬁculty here reﬂects the practical obstacles of
establishing two-way control. That crucial criterion is
not at issue, only its application. It is widely agreed
that establishing an invariant relation between a set of
conditions not under the control of the agent and an
action would be grounds for claiming automaticity, for
absence of two-way power is thereby implied. The
common mistake—as Patterson points out—is to
assert that this follows merely from identifying a
neural antecedent (Patterson, 2014). To argue thus is
to misunderstand both the neuroscience and its
conceptual context. A neural antecedent may only be
a preliminary to a test of two-way control, and even
then only when it is empirically shown to be speciﬁc to
the action in question, a feat yet to be accomplished
outside the obviously pathological domain. Not only
has no test of two-way control ever been carried out for
a reasonably complex action, no one has ever identiﬁed
a sufﬁciently speciﬁc antecedent. We are at least twice
removed from being able to begin to test the
assumptions on which thinkers such as those
Patterson criticizes are attempting to build complex
legal structures. It is not quicksand they are building
on, it is thin air.
To say this is not to say that neurology is irrelevant
to the law. If it is relevant to obviously pathological
cases—and there is no doubt about that—it will be
relevant to those falling across the shadowlines of
normality: There are no grounds for a sharp
boundary. As we naturally make allowance in our
moral judgments for obvious bodily defects that
may limit someone’s powers of action physically—
e.g., being prevented from chasing a thief by a limp—
so we should make allowance for covert neural
defects that limit an agent’s powers of action
morally. There is universal agreement that the power
to run has a somatic dependent; it would be very odd
to insist that the power to act morally does not. The
neurological literature is in any event littered with
illustrative cases of selective moral defects
demonstrably caused by focal brain dysfunction (and
reversed by its remedy).
Unlike obvious physical defects, however, where it
often makes little sense to doubt the loss of a
dependent power, neural defects need to be
inductively associated with the power in question in
the ﬁrst place. Where the defect is not reversible—as is
very common in neurology—the inductive association
will inevitably depend on the study of other patients,
and therefore on the degree of anatomical-functional
variability in the brain across the population. Since this
is high, especially for the regions of the brain on which
complex thought and behavior depend, the association
will rarely be strong except in cases where the
pathology is gross. But in such cases the manifest
behavior is usually sufﬁcient evidence. In any event,
the most neurology can do here is to clarify the
observed behavior, not to overrule it.
HYPNOSIS
The human brain is easily the most complex
biological entity we know (or, rather, do not know).
We have neither the investigative technology nor the
computational power to characterize and model it
comprehensively. Such models as we can build are
therefore necessarily partial, removing from the scene
the myriad aspects outside our technical or intellectual
reach. Indeed, this is how cognitive neuroscience
experiments—especially in imaging—are commonly
conceived. The experimenter will typically identify
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two neural states supposedly differing only along a
single, tractable dimension, the contrast between them
assuming to yield the relation of the activity of the
neural substrate to the dimension of interest. That
there is a great deal here that is unknown therefore
seems not to matter, for the unknown is on both sides
of the contrast. We divide by it, so to speak, leaving
its actuality immaterial.
The problem with the unknown here, however, is
that its interaction with the dimension of interest is
also, by deﬁnition, unknown. The degree to which
such interactions may confound our contrast is
therefore unknown. It may well be, as we have
shown for the Bereitschaftspotential, that a plausibly
invalidating interaction will be found. To say this is
not to be nihilist about neuroscience, but rather to
emphasize the importance of being on the sharp
lookout for confounding interactions when one
operates in so much uncertainty.
What we deﬁnitely cannot do, however, is to
remove interactions simply by closing our eyes to
them. And that is what is implied in the use of
hypnosis as a means of dissociating an action from
its reported voluntariness (Lanfranco, Adolﬁ, &
Ibáñez, 2014). It is constitutive of hypnosis that the
subject is in a state that differs from normality in ways
other than the speciﬁc aspect the hypnotist chooses to
modify: That is why we speak of someone being
under hypnosis. Were it not so, we would not speak
of hypnosis as a state at all. Someone hypnotically
misreporting his voluntary actions as involuntary (or,
for that matter, belonging to God, the Devil, or
anyone else) is not changed merely in that respect.
Indeed, hypnosis proceeds by making someone
receptive to suggestion and only then inducing it.
That ﬁrst, wholly opaque, step makes all subsequent
ones uninterpretable. An action may be intelligibly
rendered involuntary by hypnosis no more than it
may be thereby intelligibly rendered divine.
What hypnosis does illustrate, however, is that a
subject’s avowal of or report on the voluntariness or
intentionality of his movement is always defeasible.
As so often in life, what matters most is what one
does, not what one says. Indeed, a single avowal or
report could never be deﬁnitive here, for the presence
or absence of voluntariness—where it is in doubt—
requires the evaluation of two-way control. There are
many ways of interfering with the subject’s report, but
as long as the power to do otherwise is retained the
action is still voluntary.
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